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Abstract 
Background. Deficits in deductive reasoning have been observed among 
ecstasy/polydrug users. The present study seeks to investigate dose-related effects of specific 
drugs and whether these vary with the cognitive demands of the task. 
Methods. One hundred and five participants (mean age 21.33, S.D. 3.14; 77 females, 
28 males) attempted to generate solutions for eight one-model syllogisms and one syllogism 
for which there was no valid conclusion (NVC). All of the one model syllogisms generated at 
least one valid conclusion and six generated two valid conclusions. In these six cases one of 
the conclusions was classified as common and the other as non-common. 
Results. The number of valid common inferences was negatively associated with 
aspects of short term cannabis use and with measures of IQ. The outcomes observed were 
more than simple post intoxication effects since cannabis use in the 10 days immediately 
before testing was unrelated to reasoning performance. Following adjustment for multiple 
comparisons, the number of non-common valid inferences was not significantly associated 
with any of the drug use measures.  
Conclusions. Recent cannabis use appears to impair the processes associated with 
generating valid common inferences while not affecting the production of non common 
inferences. It is possible, therefore, that the two types of inference may recruit different 
executive resources which may differ in their susceptibility to cannabis-related effects. 
 
Key words: syllogism, inference, ecstasy drug, cannabis, cocaine  
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate the relative integrity of reasoning 
processes in users of legal and illicit drugs. In order to achieve this we utilise a well tested 
experimental paradigm which has assumed a fundamental role in the study of deductive 
reasoning: the syllogism. A syllogism contains two premises from which the participant 
attempts to derive logically necessary conclusions. Syllogisms can be framed in abstract form 
or in everyday language as in the following example: 
1. Some students are in employment 
2. All those who are in employment are paid money 
Therefore it can be concluded that: 
Some students are paid money 
Some of those who are paid money are students 
Or in abstract form: 
1. Some A are B 
2. All B are C 
Therefore 
Some A are C 
Some C are A. 
 Syllogisms are known to vary in terms of difficulty. Some pairs of premises can be 
readily solved allowing valid conclusions to be drawn by most people. In other cases, only a 
small percentage of those who attempt to derive a conclusion are successful (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). The major theoretical perspective which has emerged in the context of syllogistic 
reasoning and in deductive reasoning in general is mental models theory. It has been asserted 
that individuals construct a model or models of the premises through which they derive 
potential conclusions. While some pairs of premises can be exhaustively represented in just a 
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single model, the majority require the construction of two, or more often three, models in 
order to explore alternative formulations of the premises (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In turn, the 
construction of additional models places increased demands on working memory resources 
(Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). 
 Indeed, the direct involvement of working memory in supporting syllogistic reasoning 
is demonstrated in studies utilising the dual task methodology. For example, utilising 
Baddeley’s working memory framework, administration of a random generation task, known 
to load on the central executive component of working memory, reduced syllogistic 
reasoning performance while other concurrent tasks loading on the phonological loop and 
visuo-spatial sketchpad did not (Gilhooley et al. 1993). In a later study (Gilhooley et al. 
1999), the performance of those participants who were more proficient in solving syllogistic 
reasoning problems were similarly affected by dual tasks loading on the central executive 
while those who were less proficient appeared to be using a less cognitively demanding 
strategy which was less reliant on central executive resources. After training in deductive 
reasoning was administered, this latter group appeared to change their approach adopting a 
strategy which was more dependent on working memory resources and, accordingly, more 
susceptible to dual tasks loading on the central executive.  
It has long been argued that the processes through which mental models are 
constructed and evaluated, so as to derive valid conclusions for syllogisms, are the same as 
those which underpin real world reasoning in more everyday contexts (Bucciarelli & 
Johnson-Laird, 1999; Galotti, 1989; Morris & Nisbett, 1993). While it is frequently the case 
that everyday decisions may be intuitive and heuristic in nature, there are occasions when 
judgements require a more rational analysis and in these situations mental models theory 
provides a widely accepted account of how this is achieved (Verschueren, Schaeken, & 
d'Ydewalle, 2005). Indeed Politzer (2011) has shown that, in everyday reasoning, the 
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evaluation of natural syllogisms, i.e., those that reflect real world categorical relationships, 
appears to follow a process which is indistinguishable from strategies commonly used in 
laboratory based syllogistic reasoning tasks like those presented here. Thus, the study of 
syllogistic reasoning provides an insight into the efficacy of reasoning processes in more 
everyday contexts. 
It is clear from previous research that ecstasy/polydrug users are impaired on tests of 
syllogistic reasoning (Fisk et al. 2005; Montgomery et al. 2005). Furthermore, while 
Montgomery et al. (2005) linked this outcome specifically with ecstasy use, Fisk et al. (2005) 
found that various measures of ecstasy, cannabis and cocaine were associated with errors on 
the task. However, dose-related effects have yet to be systematically examined and the 
possibly confounding effects of legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco have been 
overlooked. It is important to establish that unambiguous dose-related effects exist. In 
previous research (Fisk et al. 2005; Montgomery et al. 2005) where dose related effects were 
apparently obtained, nonusers of specific drugs (with use coded as zero) were included in the 
sample. The problem with this is that the significant correlation and regression coefficients 
that were obtained might have been due to the absence of use within the drug naïve 
participants (i.e., the group effect) rather than a trend within the drug using participants. This 
being the case, the possibility that some premorbid or lifestyle difference between the groups 
unrelated to drug use may have been responsible for the associations that were observed 
cannot be excluded. In the evaluation of dose-related effects here, we will limit the analysis 
to those individuals actually using each specific drug. This will also allow for the increasing 
prevalence of polysubstance use to be addressed more effectively. For example, while less 
than half of Fisk et al’s (2005) ecstasy users were also using cocaine, the increased use of this 
drug among young adult recreational users has meant that it is not unusual to find that up to 
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70 or 80% of current users of ecstasy are also cocaine users while virtually all are using 
cannabis (e.g., Hadjiefthyvoulou et al. 2011). 
In a further departure from Fisk et al’s (2005) approach, while in the present study we 
use the same four one model syllogisms as they and Montgomery et al. (2005) used, here we 
have not included the more difficult two and three model problems. Fisk et al. (2005) and 
Montgomery et al. (2005) found that these elicited a success rate that was little better than 
chance among their participants. So instead, we have included an additional four one model 
problems. Furthermore, while Fisk et al. (2005) and Montgomery et al. (2005) treated correct 
responses to one model problems in an undifferentiated manner, in the present paper we will 
seek to classify responses in a different way. Unlike two and three model problems which 
generate only a single valid inference, most one model problems generate two valid 
conclusions. However, Johnson-Laird (1983) has demonstrated that only a minority of 
participants manage to produce both conclusions for one model syllogisms and although 
equally valid, some conclusions are produced far more often than others (Khemlani & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012). Using the example above, individuals are more likely to produce the 
conclusion: ‘Some students are paid money’ but less likely to generate the second valid 
conclusion: ‘Some of those who are paid money are students’. This tendency is believed to be 
at least partially due to the ordering of terms in the premises (known as the figural effect), so, 
for example, in the  syllogism set out above, conclusions of the form A to C are more likely 
to be produced than C to A. Furthermore, when at least one premise contains the particular 
quantifier (‘Some’) then the conclusion is also more likely to contain it (an example of the 
atmosphere effect) (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Thus while not necessarily placing additional 
demands on working memory, the ability to produce the less common conclusion may 
depend on other aspects of executive functioning, for example, the ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses or to switch cognitive set away from the common response so as to consider other 
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possibilities. Thus it is predicted that illicit drug use will be negatively associated with the 
number of valid inferences produced and that this tendency will be particularly evident in 
relation to the less common inferences, where the cognitive demands of the task are 
potentially greater.  
 
METHOD. 
Participants. 
One hundred and five participants (mean age 21.33, S.D. 3.14; 77 females, 28 males) 
were recruited opportunistically through direct approach to undergraduate students at 
Liverpool John Moores University and the University of Central Lancashire in the United 
Kingdom. Potential participants were recruited through the use of posters displayed around 
campus and thereafter through word-of mouth. While prospective participants were informed 
that the focus of the study was concerned with illicit drugs, those who indicated that their use 
was largely restricted to legal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) were also included. In the event 
most participants were polydrug users and the prevalence of multiple drug use may be seen in 
Table 1.Those participating in the study were asked to abstain from taking cannabis for at 
least 24 hours and other illicit drugs for seven days prior to testing. Median periods of 
abstinence were three, six, and four weeks for cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine respectively.  
<<Insert Table 1 about here.>> 
Materials. 
The use of legal and illegal drugs was assessed by means of a self report 
questionnaire. For cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, participants indicated their current 
frequency of use, their level of recent use, and the period of abstinence. They also indicated 
which other illicit drugs they had previously used. Estimates of alcohol and tobacco use were 
also obtained including current consumption levels, recent use, and duration of use. 
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Demographic variables, including age and gender, were recorded. Fluid intelligence was also 
assessed through Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven et al. 1998).  In order to provide 
information on longer term consumption patterns, for the most commonly used drugs 
(ecstasy, cannabis and cocaine), for each year since they commenced use, participants 
estimated the typical dose that they ingested in a representative session. They also estimated 
their typical frequency of use (number of sessions per week) during that year. These data 
were subsequently used to produce estimates of annual average long term dose and long term 
average frequency of use, as well as total lifetime use. Regrettably, the responses of 31 
participants relating to these longer term consumption patterns were lost during the relocation 
of one of our laboratories. Thus of the whole sample, 74 out of a total of 105 completed the 
full version of the self-report drug use questionnaire. 
Syllogistic reasoning: All syllogisms were taken from Johnson-Laird (1983, pp102-
103) where for each legitimate pair of premises the logically valid inferences (if any) are 
indicated. Participants attempted to generate solutions for eight one-model syllogisms and 
one syllogism for which there was no valid conclusion (NVC). The one model syllogisms 
were the same as those used in much of the previous research literature (see the review by 
Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012). All of the one model syllogisms generated at least one 
valid conclusion and six generated two valid conclusions. In these six cases one of the 
conclusions was classified as common and the other as non-common. The classification was 
based on data published by Johnson-Laird (1983). For the common variant, between 40 and 
95% (average 61%) of Johnson-Laird’s participants generated the correct response while for 
the non common alternative, the equivalent figures were between 0 and 25% (average 14%).  
The syllogisms used in the study were presented in random order. Participants were 
introduced to the concept of a syllogism, and examples (concrete and abstract) were 
provided. Examples and explanations were also provided for some correct and incorrect 
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inferences, and Venn diagrams were used for purposes of illustration.  Participants were told 
to generate as many conclusions as possible for each pair of premises. They were told that no 
pair generated more than two valid conclusions, some only generated one, and some had no 
valid conclusions. In addition, they were provided with a list of the eight possible solutions 
that can be generated over all the pairs of premises. The syllogisms were presented in a 
booklet, in abstract form as in the example set out above. In each case, the two premises were 
printed, followed by the instruction to ‘Please write down all valid conclusions’. Two boxes 
were provided underneath for the participant to record their responses.  A response was 
deemed correct if it followed necessarily from the premises or in the case of the NVC 
syllogism, if the participant indicated that no valid conclusions were possible. With regard to 
the common conclusions, with eight valid one-model syllogisms, the maximum number of 
correct (logical) common inferences was eight. Six of these one model syllogisms also 
generated a second but, as demonstrated by Johnson-Laird (1983), less common valid 
inference. Thus, the maximum number of correct (logical) non common inferences was six.  
Procedure. 
Participants provided verbal informed consent. The tests were administered in the 
following order: background drug use questionnaire, Ravens progressive matrices and the 
syllogistic reasoning test. A range of other measures was also administered the results of 
which are outside the scope of the present study. At the end of the session, participants were 
debriefed, paid 20 UK pounds in the form of a supermarket (grocery store) gift card, and 
provided with drug education leaflets. The study was approved by the Ethics Committees of 
Liverpool John Moores University, and the University of Central Lancashire and was 
administered in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society. 
All aspects of the Helsinki Declaration were observed except that verbal consent was 
obtained so as to protect the anonymity of the illicit drug users within our sample. 
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Design.  
Associations between the number of valid syllogistic inferences  and respectively 
background variables, alcohol and tobacco use and various indicators of legal and illegal drug 
use and were explored. While some means of controlling the Type 1 error rate is required it is 
now well established that full Bonferroni correction greatly inflates the likelihood of Type 2 
error (Nakagawa, 2004). Where test results are conditionally dependent, (as is the case with 
the present study, where there are two interrelated outcome variables and multiple inter-
correlated drug use measures) full Bonferroni correction is known to be inappropriate (Bland 
& Altman, 1995; Narum, 2006; Pike, 2010). Thus, an alternative to full Bonferroni correction 
has been adopted here, which focusses on controlling the False Discovery Rate (FDR), a 
technique which is well suited to situations where the reported outcomes are not independent 
(Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001). This involves controlling the proportion of occasions where 
true null hypotheses are falsely rejected giving rise to ‘false discoveries’. Computational 
methods are available for calculating the critical value for alpha (also known as the q value) 
which controls the FDR at a given level (e.g., Pike, 2010). The FDR rate in the present study 
was set to .05 which implies that the proportion of significant outcomes which are actually 
false discoveries is limited no more than 5%.There is a related procedure for calculating the 
critical alpha value which limits the Family Wise Error rate (FWE) without greatly inflating 
the risk of a Type 2 error, as is the case with full Bonferroni correction (Benjamini & 
Yekutieli, 2001; Narum, 2006). It is this critical level and the related FDR which has been 
used to identify those outcomes in Table 2 which can be regarded as statistically significant 
with the FWE <.05 and FDR<.05, two tailed.  
 
 
RESULTS 
11 
 
Background Data 
Examination of Table 1 reveals the extent of polydrug use among the sample. Almost 
all participants used alcohol and 30% used tobacco. The most commonly used illicit drug was 
cannabis with 63% of the sample using this drug. The proportions using ecstasy and cocaine 
were similar at approximately 50%. Less commonly used were amphetamine (19%), 
ketamine (24%) and LSD (17%) and in these three cases only 7, 9 and 4 individuals reported 
using respectively amphetamine, ketamine, and LSD during the previous 3 months and in all 
but 4 cases these individuals described their use as ‘occasional’ (as opposed to ‘frequently’ 
and ‘always’). 
For the major illicit drugs, inspection of Table 2 reveals that cannabis users were 
using approximately weekly and on average had consumed almost 12 joints during the 
previous 30 days. Those using cocaine took it approximately bi-weekly and on average had 
consumed 8 lines during the previous 30 days. Ecstasy was consumed roughly once a month 
and the individuals concerned had taken on average 4-5 tablets during the previous 30 days. 
Table 2 also contains indicators of long term use with total lifetime consumption averaging 
2427 joints, 717 lines, and 675 tablets for cannabis, cocaine, and ecstasy respectively. 
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
Syllogistic Reasoning Performance.  
Consistent with Johnson-Laird’s (1983) reported data, participants were better at 
generating common responses compared to the non-common variants. In the present study on 
average participants generated 56% of the valid common conclusions while averaged over all 
relevant one model problems 61% of Johnson-Laird’s participants produced the valid 
common conclusions. The equivalent figures for the non-common variant was 33% in the 
present study compared with just 15% among Johnson-Laird’s participants. Thus the 
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participants in the present study performed similarly to Johnson-Laird’s in terms of the 
common conclusions but did considerably better in relation to the non-common conclusions. 
 
Associations between Background Variables, Indicators of Drug use and Number of 
Correct Inferences.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, fluid intelligence was positively associated with reasoning 
performance although the magnitude of the association was higher for common inferences. 
None of the alcohol use measures were significantly associated with reasoning performance. 
Without adjustment for multiple comparisons, tobacco (cigarettes per day) was negatively 
associated with both common and non-common inferences, p<.05, two tailed, in both cases. 
Furthermore, of the illicit drugs, four of the cannabis use measures were negatively 
associated with reasoning performance at p<.05 or less, two tailed (in all cases these relate to 
valid common inferences); the long term average dose of ecstasy was also negatively related 
to the number of valid common inferences, p<.05. Lastly, the current frequency of cocaine 
use was negatively associated with non-common inferences. Analysis revealed that the 
largest of these probabilities, i.e., p=.033, was associated with an estimated FDR=.152 
implying that up to 15.2% of these apparently significant outcomes were false discoveries. 
Further analysis (Pike, 2010) demonstrated that an alpha value less than or equal to 
.002 controlled the FDR <.05. On this basis only two of the associations reported in Table 2 
were statistically significant, i.e., fluid IQ was positively, and consumption of cannabis 
during the previous 30 days negatively, associated with the number of valid common 
inferences. From an alternative perspective, a critical value of .01132 controls the FWE <.05 
two tailed (Narum, 2006). On this criterion, two additional statistically significant 
associations emerged: the current frequency of cannabis use was negatively associated with 
the number of valid common inferences and the fluid IQ measure was positively associated 
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with the number of non-common valid inferences. While Benjamini and Yekutieli’s (2001) 
procedure provides a means of selecting an alpha value which, relative to more conventional 
approaches,  is less likely to inflate the type 2 error rate, the power of the statistical procedure 
to detect a significant association remains dependent on the sample size. It is clear from Table 
2 that while the measures of short term use (e.g., the previous 30 days) for the most 
commonly used drug, cannabis, was based on a sample size of 62, longer term cannabis 
trends, such as average dose per session, was based on a sample of 46. The corresponding 
figures for short and longer term cocaine use were 38 and 26 respectively. The reduced 
number of cocaine users is clearly associated with a reduction in statistical power. For 
example, with short term consumption data for 38 cocaine users, the power to detect a 
correlation of -.389 (the outcome in relation to cannabis) with alpha = .002 (FDR adjusted) 
would be .338, one-sided. With regard to the long term cocaine data, with a sample size of 
26, the power to detect a correlation of -.324 (again, the outcome in relation to cannabis) with 
the same FDR adjusted alpha value would be just .101, one-sided. These low levels of power 
should be borne in mind when considering the apparently non significant outcomes in Table 
2. 
Returning to the significant associations that emerged in Table 2, two of these relate 
to the recent use of cannabis: current frequency of use and amount consumed during the 
previous 30 days. It is possible that these associations may reflect post intoxication effects 
connected with very recent use of the drug. To explore this possibility, we examined cannabis 
use during the ten days prior to testing and it emerged that 22 participants had used the drug 
within this period. Mean consumption among this group was 3.32 joints (SD 3.34). However, 
consumption was unrelated to reasoning performance, r= .026 (p=.910) and -.089 (p=.693) 
for common and non-common inferences respectively. 
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As noted above, IQ was significantly associated with reasoning performance. It is 
possible that those with higher short term levels of cannabis use might score lower on the IQ 
measure, leaving open to question whether the cannabis-related deficits observed were in fact 
attributable to IQ or indeed whether cannabis use adversely affects both reasoning and IQ. In 
order to examine this question, the partial correlations between cannabis use and common 
valid inferences were calculated controlling for differences in IQ. The partial correlation 
between cannabis use during the previous 30 days and valid common inferences remained 
statistically significant, r=-.346, p=.007, FWE<.05; however, the correlation between the 
current frequency of cannabis use and common inferences was reduced to below statistical 
significance, r=-.254, p=.050. Thus it appears that IQ and cannabis-related effects are, at least 
to a degree, independent. 
In order to establish whether or not the above mentioned short term cannabis-related 
effects are independent of the effects of cocaine and ecstasy two regressions were run. In both 
cases the dependent variable was the number of valid common syllogistic conclusions. In the 
first independent variables were, respectively, consumptions of cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy 
during the 30 days prior to testing. In the second independent variables were, respectively, 
the current frequencies of cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy use. For these two regressions, 
values for nonusers of specific drugs were coded as zero. In addition both regressions 
contained zero-one variables respectively for cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy in order to 
distinguish nonusers of each drug from users. This was done in order to remove the effects of 
simple group related differences that may be unrelated to direct dose-related effects. In the 
first regression the independent variables accounted for statistically significant variance in the 
number of correct common inferences, R2 =.156, F(6,94)=2.90, p=.012. Only the 
consumption of cannabis during the 30 days prior to testing was statistically significant as a 
predictor, beta=-.329, t=-3.34, p=.001, semi partial correlation coefficient = -.316. The 
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relationships between the consumption of the major illicit drugs, cannabis, cocaine, and 
ecstasy, during the 30 days prior to testing and the number of correct common syllogistic 
responses are displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3. In the second regression the independent 
variables again accounted for statistically significant variance, R2 =.148, F(6,82)=2.37, 
p=.037. The current frequency of cannabis use was statistically significant as a predictor, 
beta=-.275, t=--2.53, p=.013, semi partial correlation coefficient = -.258. Interestingly the 
current frequency of cocaine use was also statistically significant, beta=-.275, t=--2.14, 
p=.036, semi partial correlation coefficient = -.218. The remaining predictors were not 
significant. The relationships between the current frequency of cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy 
use and the number of correct common syllogistic responses are displayed in Figures 4, 5, 
and 6. 
 
DISCUSSION 
On the basis of the results reported by Fisk et al. (2005) and Montgomery et al. (2005) 
it might have been expected that ecstasy would show an inverse dose-related effect with 
reasoning performance. However, only the long term average dose of ecstasy was 
significantly associated with reasoning performance on an unadjusted basis, and this was no 
longer significant at alpha values which controlled the FDR and FWE. Among the major 
illicit drugs, cannabis use emerged as the only robust correlate of reasoning performance and 
this only in relation to the number valid common inferences. At alpha values controlling the 
FDR<.05 or the FEW<.05, the current frequency of cannabis use and the number of joints 
consumed during the 30 days prior to testing were negatively associated with the number of 
valid common inferences. Thus it appears that recent aspects of cannabis use affect reasoning 
performance although the effects observed appear unlikely to be simple post intoxication 
effects. Interestingly the regression analyses revealed that the short term effects of cannabis 
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on the number of correct common syllogistic inferences remaining statistically significant 
after controlling for the short term effects of cocaine and ecstasy. Although, on an unadjusted 
basis, the long term average dose and long term average frequency of cannabis use were 
correlated with the number of valid common inferences, these were no longer significant 
following controls for the FDR and FWE. Furthermore it is likely that these longer term 
cannabis use measures shared variance with the short term measures, raising the possibility 
that it is the latter that is behind the significant association with reasoning performance.  
We are not alone in linking other illicit drugs with less effective reasoning processes. 
For example, a group of cocaine dependent individuals, who also had a history of recent 
cannabis use, did significantly worse on the similarities reasoning test (Cunha, Nicastri, de 
Andrade & Bolla, 2010). Furthermore, in a group of polysubstance abusers who had 
requested treatment for drug related problems, measures of cocaine and cannabis use were 
selectively associated with deficits in analogical reasoning, in a dose related manner 
(Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, Río-Valle & Verdejo-García, 2010). Therefore the 
presence of illicit drug-related reasoning deficits in the present sample of illicit drug users is 
not without precedent and while previous studies using syllogisms have linked this to ecstasy 
use (Fisk et al. 2005; Montgomery et al. 2005), the present results suggest that cannabis is 
also implicated. It is also worthy of note that Cunha et al’s (2010)  and Fernández-Serrano et 
al’s (2010) results relate to drug dependent clinical groups while our focus here was 
recreational users. Furthermore, these studies  (and others) have used reasoning paradigms 
with a substantial verbal component, raising the possibility that the deficits observed might 
reflect aspects of verbal processing rather than pure reasoning processes (Rodriguez-Moreno 
& Hirsch, 2009). By way of contrast, our research materials were more abstract in nature and 
utilised only elementary verbal concepts. 
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With regard to the underlying causes of cannabis-related effects, there is evidence to 
suggest that a history of cannabis use is associated with neural changes in areas which play a 
role in reasoning performance. For example, Kanayama et al (2004) found that relative to 
controls, cannabis users demonstrated higher activation levels in the PFC and anterior 
cingulate during the completion of a spatial working memory task and also showed 
activations in areas not normally seen in controls including the basal ganglia. Also using 
fMRI, Jager et al. (2006) found that while frequent (but moderate) cannabis users performed 
similarly to nonusers in tests of working memory and visuo-auditory selective attention, 
differences were observed in brain activity between users and nonusers in the superior 
parietal cortex during performance of the tasks. In a subsequent study Jager et al (2007) asked 
their participants to perform an associative learning task while undergoing fMRI. Lower 
activation levels among frequent cannabis users were observed in the medial temporal 
structures (especially the para-hippocampal area) and the right DLPFC, although 
paradoxically task performance was again unaffected. Kanayama et al. (2004) and Jager et al. 
(2006; 2007) have suggested that the differential pattern of neural activity evident in cannabis 
users may reflect the need to recruit additional cognitive resources in order to maintain 
performance at a comparable level to nonusers. 
Over a number of years, evidence has emerged that syllogistic reasoning is dependent 
on prefrontal cortical resources. For example, in two recent neuroimaging studies, Reverberi 
and co workers found that relative to simply recalling the premises, actively encoding them 
was associated with increased activity in left hemisphere prefrontal structures including 
Brodmann areas (BA) 44 and 45. During integration of the premises BA44/45 remained 
differentially activated along with BA6 and areas within the VLPFC (BA47), the parietal 
cortex (BA7) and the basal ganglia (Reverberi et al. 2010; 2012). Rodriguez-Moreno and 
Hirsch (2009) have also emphasised the role of more DLPFC structures (including left 
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hemisphere BA 6, 8, 9, and 10), VLPFC structures, (e.g., BA47) and left hemisphere parietal 
regions (BA 7, 39, and 40) in syllogistic reasoning performance. Similar cortical regions were 
identified by Goel et al. (2000) in an early study investigating the cortical basis of reasoning 
with abstract syllogisms as are used in the present study. Thus the neural areas identified by 
Jager et al (2006; 2007) and Kanayama et al (2004) that were differentially activated in 
cannabis users also appear to play a prominent role in reasoning performance. For example, it 
is worthy of note that among the regions identified by Reverberi et al. (2010; 2012) that were 
differentially recruited during the integration of the syllogistic premises i.e., the superior 
parietal cortex and basal ganglia, are the same as those that were identified by Jager et al 
(2006; 2007) and Kanayama et al (2004) as being potentially compromised among cannabis 
users during the performance of tasks loading on working memory. While these were not 
associated with performance deficits in working memory, it is possible that the greater 
cognitive demands associated with the reasoning task did result in the apparent cannabis-
related deficit. For example, it is worthy of note that among the regions identified by 
Reverberi et al. (2010; 2012) that were differentially recruited during the integration of the 
syllogistic premises, i.e., the superior parietal cortex and basal ganglia, are the same as those 
that were identified by Jager et al (2006; 2007) and Kanayama et al (2004) as being 
potentially compromised among cannabis users during the performance of tasks loading on 
working memory. While these were not associated with performance deficits in working 
memory it is possible that the greater cognitive demands associated with the reasoning task 
did result in the apparent cannabis-related deficit. 
An additional unanticipated finding, in the present study, was the negative association 
between the number of (tobacco) cigarettes typically consumed daily and reasoning 
performance. Although statistically significant on an unadjusted basis these associations were 
not significant at alpha levels which controlled the FDR and FWE. Nonetheless the results 
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remain noteworthy since the absolute magnitudes of the correlations were relatively high, 
based on generally small numbers of current smokers. Interestingly, Jacobsen et al (2007) 
note that most cannabis users also smoke tobacco and that the joint effects of these two 
psychoactive substances remains unclear. Indeed Jacobsen et al. (2007) found that verbal 
memory and learning was impaired among adolescent cannabis users (but not nonusers) 
during a period of nicotine withdrawal. Through fMRI it was established that the impairment 
was associated with disrupted frontoparietal connectivity. Thus it is possible that nicotine and 
cannabis may interact in terms of their effects potentially giving rise to reasoning 
impairments (Jacobsen et al 2007). 
As expected, IQ was significantly associated with both the number of common and 
non-common inferences. As Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2012) note since many 
intelligence test actually contain syllogistic or functionally equivalent problems a significant 
association might therefore be expected. However, perhaps surprisingly, there is relatively 
little current research into the association between the two constructs. In one of the few recent 
studies, Shikishima et al. (2009) found that syllogistic reasoning problems (including 
abstract, graphical and congruent) loaded highly on the general IQ construct ‘g’ along with 
more conventional verbal and spatial tests of IQ. Indeed the respective loadings on g of the 
three classes of measure were highest for the syllogistic reasoning measures. Furthermore 
genetic and environmental influences were consistent across the three separate performance 
classes, yielding a significant genetic correlation and a high degree of heritability for the 
latent ‘g’ construct. In a subsequent study (Shikishima et al. 2011), syllogistic reasoning 
ability was observed to have similar characteristics as other indicators of intelligence, 
exhibiting a similar developmental trajectory, as well as exhibiting the usual relationship with 
socio-economic status. Furthermore, syllogistic reasoning was genetically correlated with 
aspects of scholastic achievement. Thus the significant relationship observed here between IQ 
20 
 
and reasoning is consistent with current research findings in this area. The only surprising 
outcome was that the correlation between IQ and non common inferences was less that that 
with common inferences. Given that non common inferences are more demanding on 
cognitive resources, a stronger relationship with IQ might have been expected. 
It is also surprising that, following controls for the FDR and FEW, none of the drug 
use measures were significantly associated with the number of non common valid inferences. 
At face value, this might be taken as evidence that that illicit drug use does not compromise 
whatever cognitive abilities and resources support the generation of non common inferences. 
It has been demonstrated that producing valid inferences recruits working memory (updating) 
resources (e.g., Gilhooly et al. 1993; 1999). It may be the case that other executive processes 
such as inhibition and shifting are required to switch the focus away from the dominant 
(common) response and search for other valid inferences. Research suggests that while 
ecstasy/polydrug users are impaired in updating component executive processes, shifting and 
inhibition are relatively spared (Murphy et al. 2009). Thus the present results may be a 
reflection of this. 
Some limitations need to be acknowledged in relation to the present study. For 
example, we have used zero order and partial correlation. While regression analysis might 
have been preferable, the sample size was insufficient since it is effectively constrained by 
the smallest subset of illicit drug uses, i.e., cocaine users in the present case. While we might 
have coded non use of specific drugs as ‘0’ the problem with this is that it potentially 
introduces group level effects which may be due to factors (e.g., premorbid or lifestyle 
differences) other than the particular drug in question.  An additional factor mitigating against 
the use of regression, was the degree of intercorrelation between some of the drug use 
measures which would give rise to multicolinearity.  
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Caution needs to be exercised when drawing inferences concerning the association 
observed here between cannabis and reasoning performance. While the existence of a dose-
related relationship between a particular drug and cognitive performance is consistent with 
the possibility that increasing amounts of the drug have a tendency to directly affect 
performance, it remains possible that heavy users may exhibit premorbid or life style 
differences in relation to light users which may be, at least in part, responsible for the 
performance differences that we have observed. For example, there may be differences in 
diet, or sleep quality which might mediate the effects observed. Alternatively the higher 
doses consumed might reflect a tendency for increased impulsivity which might also have a 
direct effect on performance. The cannabis users in the present study were predominantly 
polydrug users and therefore it is possible that the effects observed may in fact reflect some 
sort of cocktail effect, i.e., the combined effect of cannabis and some other drug or drugs. 
Furthermore, there were associations between other drugs and reasoning performance which 
although not significant when controlling the FDR and FWE, nonetheless might become so 
were a larger sample employed. Indeed, on an unadjusted basis, among the illicit drugs, only 
cocaine use was significantly associated with non common inferences. Furthermore, as noted 
above, the very small sample sizes, especially in relation to cocaine severely restricts the 
power of the analysis to detect a modest correlation of between 0.3 and 0.4 should one 
actually exist. Thus the implications of the non significant outcomes in Table 2 remain 
somewhat ambiguous. 
An additional limitation that needs to be acknowledged is that in common with much 
of the existing literature, this study has relied on self-report data in relation to drug use. 
However, while objective measures would have been desirable, research suggests a high 
degree of concordance between self-report and objective measures of recent drug use from 
saliva (Yacoubian & Wish, 2006) and of longer term use from hair (Scholey et al. 2011; 
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Vignali et al. 2012). Furthermore, concordance between self-reports and objective measures 
of drug use has been demonstrated for multiple illicit drugs (Vignali et al. 2012), cannabis 
and cocaine (Vignali et al. 2012; Zaldívar, et al. 2009) and ecstasy (Scholey et al. 2011; 
Yacoubian & Wish, 2006). 
Lastly, it is noteworthy that there is a degree of missing data which is readily apparent 
comparing the sample sizes associated with the various measures in Table 2. This was partly 
due to oversight on our part in that data on long term consumption patterns was misplaced 
when one of our laboratories relocated.  Beyond this, participants were better able to report 
on the extent of their recent use and make categorical distinctions, e.g., whether or not they 
had ever used a particular drug, as opposed to confidently reporting longer term trends. In a 
few instances, responses were missing from the questionnaire possibly due to questions being 
overlooked. A degree of missing data is not uncommon in studies of this kind (e.g., Bedi & 
Redman, 2008; Indlekofer et al. 2009). However, while we wished to avail ourselves of the 
largest possible sample for each of the comparisons in question, it should be borne in mind 
that some of the significant associations (or lack of them) reported in Table 2 relate to sub-
sets of the data.    
In conclusion, among the illicit drug users in the present study, aspects of recent 
cannabis use emerged as being associated with poor syllogistic reasoning performance. The 
effects observed do not appear to reflect simple short term post intoxication effects and the 
possibility that they may be linked with the concurrent use of tobacco or some other illicit 
drug cannot be excluded. Aside from the drug related effects, a significant association was 
observed between IQ (Raven’s Progressive Matrices) and syllogistic reasoning performance. 
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Table 1: Number of Individuals Co-Using Legal and Illegal Drugs 
Drug Total 
number 
of Users 
Co-Used With: 
  Alcohol Amphet- 
amine 
Cannabis Cocaine  Ecstasy Ketamine LSD 
Alcohol 101 - 19 62 47 52 24 17 
Amphetamine 20 19 - 20 19 19 16 15 
Cannabis 66 62 20 - 45 47 24 18 
Cocaine 50 47 19 45 - 43 24 18 
Ecstasy 54 52 19 47 43 - 24 17 
Ketamine 25 24 16 24 24 24 - 14 
LSD 18 17 15 18 18 17 14 - 
Tobacco 32 31 11 25 20 20 11 8 
30 
 
Table 2: The relationship between syllogistic reasoning and legal and illegal drug use 
r = zero order correlation; df = degrees of freedom 
*** for m=46 , p≤.002 controls FDR<.05; ** for m=46  p<.01132 controls FWE <.05; * p<.05; † 
p<.10; all two tailed.  
 Mean SD n Correlation: r  
    Common 
Inferences 
Non Common 
Inferences 
 
Syllogistic Reasoning       
Common Inferences 
(max 8) 
4.59 2.20 105  .375***  
Non Common 
Inferences (max 6) 
2.03 1.53 105 .375***   
       
       
Background Variables       
Ravens IQ (max 60) 45.40 8.61 104 .448*** .250**  
Age (years) 21.33 3.14 105 .035        -.050  
       
Legal Drugs       
Alcohol       
Length of Use (weeks) 363.10 186.02 98 .160  .021  
Previous 10 days use 
(units) 
16.07 14.21 83 .035  .079  
Units per week 13.31 11.14 100 .079  .013  
Tobacco       
Length of Use (weeks) 343.23 230.27 54 .126  -.091  
Previous 10 days use 
(cigarettes) 
82.00 78.08 26 -.274  -.292  
Cigarettes per day 8.68 7.83 34 -.405* -.366*  
       
Illegal Drugs       
Total Prior Consumption       
Cannabis (joints) 2427.19 4270.51 46 -.151  .118  
Cocaine (lines) 716.91 1234.12 26  .116  .198  
Ecstasy (tablets) 675.30 1345.78 41 -.137  -.038  
Long Term Average 
Dose Per Session 
      
Cannabis (joints) 2.71 2.05 46 -.324* -.101  
Cocaine (lines) 5.73 4.34 26  .019  .032  
Ecstasy (tablets) 3.82 5.57 41 -.351*  -.237   
Long Term Average 
Frequency (times per 
week) 
      
Cannabis 2.19 2.35 46 -.355*  .001  
Cocaine 0.71 0.63 26 -.314 -.167  
Ecstasy 0.72 1.15 41 -.185   .038  
Amount Consumed in 
Previous 30 Days 
      
Cannabis (joints) 11.75 34.65 62 -.389*** -.157  
Cocaine (lines) 8.24 12.99 38 -.148 -.290† 
Ecstasy (tablets) 4.30 10.80 54 -.206 -.177 
Current Frequency of 
Use (times per week) 
     
Cannabis 0.80 1.59 62 -.328** -.132 
Cocaine 0.40 0.47 37 -.281† -.363* 
Ecstasy 0.28 0.44 54 -.040  -.112  
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Appendix 1. Syllogisms Used in the Study 
 
 
Some of the B are A 
All of the B are C 
 
All of the A are B 
None of the B are C 
 
Some of the B are A 
All of the C are B 
 
All of the B are A 
Some of the C are B 
 
Some of the A are B 
All of the B are C 
 
All of the B are A 
All of the C are B 
 
All of the A are B 
None of the C are B 
 
None of the A are B 
All of the C are B 
 
All of the A are B 
All of the B are C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
